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RECENT CASES
examination of procedural protections will not only provide a method for
determining the reasonableness of proposed body intrusions, but it also will
serve to highlight the right of the individual to hold his person inviolate







Kansas City v. Darby"
Robert Darby was convicted of exhibiting an obscene motion picture
in violation of a Kansas City ordinance.2 Darby was tried without a jury
.in the Kansas City Municipal Court.3 On appeal to the circuit court
Darby filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that he "was denied in
the Municipal Court trial below the right to have community standards
with regard to the question of obscenity determined by a jury . .. . "
The motion was overruled and, after a jury trial in the circuit court
facts and circumstances of each case, see note 30, supra, nor the possibility that often
the public interests in obtaining evidence may outweigh the inviolability of the
person. For an excellent discussion of the factors to be considered in deciding what is
reasonable in a particular fact situation, see Comment, supra note 29, at 312-18. For
arguments supporting the "per se unreasonable" position, see Note, Criminal Proce-
dure-Search and Seizure-Bodily Intrusions-Substantive Interpretation of Fourth
Amendment Rights, 50 TUL. L. REv. 411, 417-18 (1976); Note, Surgery and the Search for
Evidence: United States v. Crowder, 37 U. Pn-r. L. REv. 429, 438-41 (1975). The latter
note was published before the original court of appeals decision in Crowder was
withdrawn.
1. 544 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. En Banc 1976), appeal dismissed, 97 S.Ct. 2644
(1977).
2. KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES § 5.56 (1967) provides: "No
person shall exhibit in the city any motion picture which he knows is immoral,
obscene or detrimental to the public good, or rent, sell or give the same to any
other person for the purpose of exhibition."
3. Id. § 22.1 prohibits jury trials in municipal court.
4. 544 S.W.2d at 530.
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Darby was convicted and sentenced to 120 days in jail and a five
hundred dollar fine. The Kansas City District of the Missouri Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed,
holding that a jury trial "in the first instance" is required for a determi-
nation of obscenity under the first and fourteenth amendments. A jury
determination of obscenity at the appeal stage in the circuit court was
held to be insufficient. 5
In McNary v. Carlton,6 an action to enjoin the sale and distribution of
an obscene book under section 563.285, RSMo 1969, the Missouri Su-
preme Court previously held that a jury determination of obscenity
under the standards established by the United States Supreme Court in
Miller v. California was constitutionally required. Darby makes it clear
that an opportunity for such a jury determination must be available to a
defendant in the first instance, that is, in the initial judicial proceeding.
A persuasive argument can be made that a jury trial is not constitu-
tionally necessary in either the Darby or McNary situations. The
maximum penalty that Darby could have received in municipal court for
violating the city ordinance was six months imprisonment, or a five
hundred dollar fine, or both.8 The United States Supreme Court has
recognized since Callan v. Wilson 9 that there is a class of petty offenses
which may be tried without a jury. In Baldwin v. New York 10 the Su-
preme Court ruled that for purposes of the right to a jury trial, an of-
fense could be classified as petty if authorized imprisonment did not
exceed six months. Missouri adopted the rule of Baldwin in State ex rel.
Cole v. Nigro,1 holding that there was no right to a jury trial in munici-
pal court where the violation of an ordinance could incur no more than
six months imprisonment.
In finding that a jury trial is constitutionally required in obscenity
cases at the municipal court level, the Missouri Supreme Court in Darby
considered the following passage from Callan "extremely persuasive." 12
Except in that class or grade of offenses called petty offenses ... the
guarantee of an impartial jury to the accused in a criminal
prosecution ... secures to him the right to enjoy that mode of
trial from the first moment, and in whatever court, he is put on
trial for the offense charged.1 3
5. Id. at 532.
6. 527 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
7. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
8. KANSAS CITY, Mo., CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES § 1.17 (1967).
9. 127 U.S. 540, 555 (1888).
10. 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970).
11. 471 S.W.2d 933 (Mo. En Banc), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 804 (1971) (per
curiam); accord, Kansas City v. Bott, 509 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
12. 544 S.W.2d at 530.
13. 127 U.S. at 557 (emphasis added).
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The Missouri court failed to recognize the petty nature of Darby's of-
fense; an offense," under rulings of both the United States and Missouri
Supreme Courts, to which no right to a jury trial would attach.
The holding of the Missouri Supreme Court in McNary, that a jury
determination of obscenity is required in an action to enjoin sale or dis-
tribution of allegedly obscene materials,'14 was also not required. The
United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion remanding Alexan-
der v. Virginia 15 for further proceedings consistent with Miller, stated
that "[a] trial by jury is not constitutionally required in this state civil
proceeding .... 16 In Alexander the Court cited Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown 17 where a jury trial was found not to be required under a New
York obscenity statute almost identical to the Missouri statute under
which the defendant in McNary was convicted.
Ignoring these precedents, the Missouri Supreme Court determined
that the first amendment, as applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, requires a jury determination of obscenity under the Miller
test.
In Miller the Supreme Court established guidelines for a determina-
tion of obscenity by the trier of fact:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest ...; (b) whether the work de-
picts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value.' 8
At first glance, it appears that the Miller test does give jurors wide dis-
cretion in determining whether materials appeal to the prurient interest
and are patently offensive. 19 Certainly the Missouri court's decisions in
McNary and Darby are based on the premise that a defendant must be
given an opportunity to have a jury make a determination of "contem-
porary community standards." 20 However, analysis of the cases decided
14. 527 S.W.2d at 348.
15. 413 U.S. 836 (1973).
16. Id.
17. 354 U.S. 436 (1957), construing N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 22 (a) (McKin-
ney), as amended by 1954 N.Y. Laws, ch. 702 and 1957 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 681 (re-
pealed 1970).
18. 413 U.S. at 24.
19. Note, Jenkins v. Ga. and Hamling v. United States: Testing the Miller Obscenity
Test, 7 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTs L. REv. 349, 353 (1975).
20. In McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Mo. En Banc 1975), the
court stated that "[t]he residents of each [county] should be accorded the
privilege, by utilization of the jury system and within the Miller guidelines, of
determining for themselves what material would be considered obscene by the
average person in their communities."
19781
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after Miller shows that, as a standard for determining obscenity, the
contemporary community standard is a hopelessly inadequate tool. The
Missouri court relied too heavily on the ability of jurors to determine
whether a certain work is obscene.
The Supreme Court in Miller rejected the notion that obscenity was
to be determined by the use of a national standard, finding a nationwide
standard too "abstract" to aid jurors in making a determination of
obscenity. The Court reasoned that whether material appeals to the pru-
rient interest and is patently offensive is essentially a question of fact,
and that the "nation is simply too big and too diverse" to apply a
nationwide standard of obscenity.21 The Court went on to hold that for
the purpose of ascertaining community standards, defining the "com-
munity" as the state of California was constitutionally acceptable. 22 Mil-
ler is predicated upon the assumption that there is a definable commun-
ity with a readily ascertainable standard of what is "patently offensive."
However, in the two major obscenity cases following Miller, the Su-
preme Court did not require definition of the specific community re-
ferred to in "contemporary community standards." In Jenkins v. Georgia 21
the jury was instructed to apply "community standards," with no further
definition of the word "community," in determining whether a film
would appeal to the prurient interest. It is difficult to imagine what
could be more abstract than an undefined community. Yet the Court in
Jenkins held that a state could define an obscenity offense in terms of
"contemporary community standards" without further specification.2 4
In Hamling v. United States 25 the jury was instructed to apply the
standards of the nation as a whole in determining the obscenity of the
material involved. In Miller the Supreme Court stated that a national
standard was too "hypothetical and unascertainable" 26 to allow the trier
of fact to determine whether a work is obscene. In Hamling, however,
the Supreme Court held that the use of a nationwide standard did not
materiilly prejudice the defendant.27 The Court's rationale for requir-
ing a finding of patent offensiveness and appeal to the prurient interest
in terms of a contemporary community standard was to give the fact
finder a concrete standard to use in determining the obscenity vel non of
21. 413 U.S. at 30. A recent Gallup survey indicates that the public thinks a
single nationwide standard should be applied in determining a work's obscenity
rather than a local community standard. Columbia (Mo.) Daily Tribune, April 4,
1977, at 4, col. 1.
22. 413 U.S. at 33-34.
23. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
24. Id. at 157.
25. 418 U.S. 87, 103 (1974).
26. 413 U.S. at 31.
27. 418 U.S. at 107.
[Vol. 43144
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a work, and to allow obscenity regulation to reflect local morality.2 8
Contrary to this rationale, the Jenkins and Hamling decisions support the
position that there is no practical distinction between the application of a
community standard or of a nationwide standard.
If allegedly obscene works are to be evaluated by jurors in terms of
a community standard, appellate review will be severely limited, as the
appellate judge will have difficulty in ascertaining the community stand-
ard determined by a properly charged jury.29 However, the apparent
approval by the Court of de novo determination of obscenity on appeal
makes a jury determination of contemporary community standards far
less important. Miller reserved the right for appellate courts to make an
independent review of constitutional claims in obscenity cases. 30 In Jen-
kins the Supreme Court overturned a finding of obscenity made by a
properly charged jury without discussing why the jury was wrong or
what standard of review was to be used under the "contemporary com-
munity standards" test.31 In Hamling the Court found that a finding of
obscenity was justified, even though the jury used the improper national
standard in determining the material's obscenity. 2 Jenkins and Hamling
support the conclusion that appellate judges may review obscenity cases
and make their own determination of patent offensiveness and appeal to
the prurient interest.33 Perhaps the Supreme Court realized that even
when a community is precisely defined in terms of a specific geographic
area, there is no ascertainable community standard.34 Whenever two or
more persons are asked to determine whether material appeals to the
prurient interest and is patently offensive, it is unlikely that unifori
criteria will be used.
28. 413 U.S. at 30. In the Hamling decision the Court stated that the
rationale for requiring a judgment to be made in terms of contemporary com-
munity standards is to insure that material is not judged by the standards of an
overly sensitive or insensitive person. 418 U.S. at 107. This is the reason the
court in Miller instructed the jury to apply the standard of the average person in
the community. 413 U.S. at 33.
29. See Note, supra note 19, at 359. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has
ruled that since questions of prurient appeal and patent offensiveness are ques-
tions of fact, appellate review is limited to the last element of the Miller test-
whether the work lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. Court
v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 570, 217 N.W.2d 676 (1974).
30. 413 U.S. at 25 (1973).
31. 418 U.S. at 161. See Note, supra note 19, at 359.
32. 418 U.S. at 107.
33. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 164-65 (1974) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). Brennan quotes from his own dissent from Paris Adult Theatre, Inc. v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 92 (1973): "Thus it's clear that as long as the Miller test
remains in effect 'one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene until at
least five members of this court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have
pronounced it so.'
34. Wallace, Obscenity and Contemporary Community Standards: A Survey, 29:3 J.
Soc. IssUEs 53, 66 (1973).
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The Missouri Supreme Court's holding, that a jury determination of
obscenity under the Miller guidelines is always constitutionally required,
may be ill-founded. First, the inadequacy of the community standard for
determining obscenity cannot help but result in unsatisfactory and in-
consistent verdicts. Second, the availability of a de novo determination of
obscenity on appeal has the effect of permitting judges to determine the
facts themselves. Notwithstanding these arguments, if obscenity convic-
tions are to stand after the holding in Darby, prosecutors in Missouri
must insure that defendants have the opportunity "in the first instance"
to have a jury determination of the obscenity vel non of the material in
question.
In order to provide the constitutionally necessary jury determination
as defined by the Missouri Supreme Court, Kansas City could amend its
ordinances to allow jury trials for obscenity prosecutions in municipal
court. Considering the relatively small number of obscenity prosecutions
in municipal court and the cost of establishing a jury selection system,
such a provision would be impractical. The alternative is a suit in circuit
court brought by the city attorney to enjoin the publication, sale, or dis-
tribution of obscene materials.35 However, such a suit would not involve
criminal penalties as did the municipal ordinance in Darby. County pros-
ecutors can bring criminal actions in magistrate court or circuit court
under several Missouri statutes. 36
The major criminal obscenity statute in Missouri is section 563.280,
RSMo 1969, which makes it a crime to publish, sell, circulate, etc.,
obscene works. To insure that the defendant's constitutional rights are
not violated, the jury must be instructed on the determination of the
work's obscenity under the Miller guidelines. Following is a jury instruc-
tion suggested for use under this statute, which with minor adaptations
may be used for the other obscenity statutes:
OBSCENE MATERIAL: Publication, Sale, Circulation, etc.3 7
(As to Count , if) (If) you find and believe from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:
35. § 563.285, RSMo 1969. Bringing suit under this section poses special
problems for the prosecutor. In McNary the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that
even though the action under this statute is an equitable action for an injunction,
an advisory jury must rule on the issue of the work's obscenity. The Missouri
Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, however, have no provision for special
verdicts. The court in McNary did not deal with this problem. See Note, The
Binding AdvisoryJury in Missouri Obscenity Cases, 45 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 159 (1976).
36. See §§ 563.270, .280, .290, .310, RSMo 1969. Section 542.281, RSMo
(Supp. 1975), provides for the search and seizure of obscene material, but given
the procedural safeguards incorporated into the statute making it difficult to
seize more than a few copies of allegedly obscene material, this statute is seldom
used.
37. § 563.280, RSMo (1969).
[Vol. 43
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First, that (on) (on or about) in the (City) (County
of) , State of Missouri, the defendant (manufactured) 38 a
[describe the material] which is obscene, and
Second, that defendant knew of the character of the [describe
the material] and knowingly (manufactured) 39 it, then you
will find the defendant guilty (under Count ) of the
(manufacturing) 40 of an obscene [describe -the material].
However, if you do not find and believe from the evidence be-
yond a reasonable doubt each and all of the foregoing, you must
find the defendant not guilty of that offense.
Material is "obscene" within the meaning of this instruction if:
1. The average person, applying the existing standards of the
community of County would find that the
material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,
which is a shameful or morbid interest in sex, and excites
lewd or lustful desires, 41 and
2. The material depicts or describes in a clearly and obviously
offensive way [representations or descriptions of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; or rep-
resentations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory func-
tions, and lewd exhibitions of the genitals], 42 and
38. Insert other acts prohibited by the statute: (printed) (published) (bought)
(sold) (offered for sale) (had in his possession with intent to circulate) (gave
away) (distributed).
39. See note 38 supra.
40. See note 38 supra.
41. The guidelines established by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California
require the trier of fact to determine "whether 'the average person, applying
contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest ... ." 413 U.S. at 24. In McNary v. Carlton, the
Missouri Supreme Court seemed to say that the applicable community standard
is the standard of the county from which the jurors come:
We doubt that residents in St. Louis County would view a question
of obscenity in the same light as residents of Dade County. We con-
sider it important, in determining the issues of obscenity, that
neither be bound by the other. The residents of each should be
accorded the privilege, by utilization of the jury system and within
the Miller guidelines, of determining for themselves what material
would be considered obscene by the average person in their com-
munities.
527 S.W.2d at 347-48.
42. The Miller guidelines require that the trier of fact find that the work
"depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically de-
fined by the applicable state law .... " 413 U.S. at 24.
The Missouri Supreme Court held in McNary that § 563.280, RSMo (1969),
would not be unconstitutionally vague only if the word obscene is construed to
regulate the descriptions listed in the instruction. 527 S.W.2d at 346. Thus, it
would seem that these descriptions have become an element of the offense.
Therefore, a jury determination that the material is a patently offensive descrip-
tion of an ultimate sexual act, etc., is required, rather than merely a determina-
tion that the work is patently offensive.
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